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STATE OF UTAH 
CURTIS C. BOSWORTH and 
DOROTHY BOSWORTH, 
vs. 
GEORGE I. NORMAN, JR., and 
RespondPnts, 
ROBERT SHERMAN, Partners, doing business as 
Downbeat Broadcasting Associates, 
Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties will be called plaintiffs and defendants. 
The action involves a contract for the sale and purchase 
of real property on Washington Boulevard in Ogden, 
Utah, and the effect of a party wall agreement as to 
the north wall of the building. For convenient reference 
we quote the contract between the parties as follows : 
"This 27th day of ,June, 1960, it is hereby intend-
ed and understood that Curtis C. Bosworth, his 
wife, heirs, and assigns, herein referred to as 
Sellers, agree to sell a certain building together 
with its certain real property located at 2268 
Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah, to George 
I. Norman, Jr., and Robert Sherman, dba DOWN-
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BEAT BROADCASTING ASSOCIATES, oper-
ators of KSVN, a radio station located in Ogden, 
Utah, herein referred to as the Buyers, for the 
total price of $30,000.00 at the following terms: 
"A $5,000.00 check to be held in escrow by 
the Seller pending issuance of title insur-
ance to be paid for by the Buyers, abstract 
to be furnished to the Title Company by 
the Sellers; a quit claim deed to be filed 
and given to the Buyers from the Sellers; 
and a first mortgage to be executed and filed 
against said property to the benefit of the 
Sellers in the amount of $25,000.00 plus in-
terest at the rate of 7%. 
"The Buyers will pay the Sellers $5,000.00 
each and every year effective one year from 
the date of the transfer of the deed until 
the entire -balance of -$25,000.00 principal 
plus interest at 7% amortized but on the 
unpaid balance only, is paid. Payment to 
be made in one installment annually. 
"Buyers are assured by the Sellers at the 
time of closing that all taxes, encumbrances, 
liens or any other possible indebtedness has 
been paid in full and is their (Sellers') com-
plete liability. BuyerR pay all taxes after 
July 1, 1960. 
"This being the entire written and oral agree-
ment between Buyers and Sellers this 27th 
day of June, 1960. Buyers pay all costs and 
attorneys' fees in case of default." 
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Plaintiffs take issue with defendant's state1nent of 
fact that there was a discrepancy as to ownership of the 
south one inch of the property. They also take issue 
with the statement that upon learning of the plaintiffs' 
party wall agreement, defendants immediately notified 
plaintiffs they could not proceed with the contract; and 
also take issue with the statement that because of the 
party wall defendants could not remodel the building. 
We think, however, these last two factual disputes are 
of no great consequence on this appeal. 
Additional important facts are these : The property 
involved in this transaction is located on Washington 
Boulevard in the center of the business district (T-5). 
Plaintiffs afforded defendants ample opportunity to in-
spect the premises and they did inspect the same before 
purchasing (T-8, 39, 41). Plaintiffs wanted defendants 
to wait and have the transaction handled in a normal 
manner with attorneys for both parties involved. De-
fendants refused to wait and insisted on closing the 
transaction immediately (T-9, 10). The party wall in 
question was plainly visible and ascertainable by phys-
ical inspection (T-19, 34, 37, 97). There is no suggestion 
in the evidence that plaintiffs were unaware of the party 
wall after they inspected the premises, or that the party 
wall was of any importance. It was not of any import-
ance to plaintiffs (T-19). The trial court personally view-
ed the premises before making its Findings of Fact. 
The contract was at least largely drafted by the defend-
ants (T-10, 101). There is no sugestion in the evidence 
that plaintiffs sought to mislead defendants with respect 
to the party wall or to conceal it from defendants. The 
sale of the property in question was by street number 
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and not by metes and bounds (Exhibit A), and there 
are no affirmative obligations imposed by the party wall 
agreement (Page 45· of Abstract of Title, Exhibit D). 
Aside from the fact that the sale was by quit claim 
deed, we make the following observations regarding the 
alleged one-inch discrepancy in the south boundary of 
the property: 
( 1) If such a discrepancy existed and if a warranty 
deed had been called for, this would not be a material 
discrepancy. 
( 2) There is in fact no one-inch discrepancy that is 
a cloud on the title. We can't cite the court to the page 
of the abstract (Exhibit D) where this one-inch discrep-
ancy is found; however, as shown in the abstract of title 
and in the title report (Exhibit 1), a stranger to the 
title conveyed property on the south of the property 
involved in this lawsuit and the description in this stran-
ger conveyance overlaps one inch. This is not a cloud 
on the title. (See Utah State Bar Association Title Stan-
dard No. 9.) 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
Point 1: The trial court did not err in denying de-
fendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. 
Point 2: The trial court did not err in dismissing 
defendants' counterc.laim. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1: The trial court did not err in denying de-
fendants' motion to dismiss the con1plaint. 
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DefendantH' motion to dismiss was made at the 
conclusion of the plaintiffs' case and before defendants 
offered evidence. It appears to us, however, that the 
whole question involved here is whether or not there was 
fraud, and in our consideration of this Point 1 we shall 
review all the evidence in the case, since reading the 
transcript will certainly show plaintiffs' case was at 
least as strong before defendants' case was presented 
as it was at the conclusion of the trial. Actually, Points 
1 and 2 may be considered together, since both are found-
ed upon alleged fraud of the plaintiffs. Perhaps an or-
derly presentation of the points would require that we 
review only the plaintiffs' testimony against the la\v 
on fraud to determine if that testimony shows fraud 
as a matter of law. We believe, however, that the whole 
picture can best be presented if we review all the evi-
dence on both sides to see if the court erred in holding 
that there was no fraud. 
The contract called for conveyance by quit claim 
deed. It contained this provision: 
"Buyers are assured by the Sellers at the time 
of closing that all taxes, encumbrances, liens or 
other possible indebtedness has been paid in 
full .... " 
It is this language that defendants seek to balloon into 
a representation by plaintiffs that there was no party 
wall agreement affecting the property. Our, first in-
quiry, then, is whether or not this language is suscept-
ible of such an interpretation. We believe it is not. 
The court must make its own interpretation of this 
language, and we- find no authorities one way or the 
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other that are helpful to the court in making its inter-
pretation. A statement of our own interpretation is ad-
mittedly of little value to the court. We must state, 
however, that read in its entire context the Sellers by 
this language merely assure the Buyers that they don't 
owe anything on the property. It is an assurance that 
there is no mortgagee, lienholder or the like to arise 
and contest the sale and conveyance. It is an assurance 
that the Buyers are dealing with the persons who are 
able to consummate the sale and that even though the 
conveyance is by quit claim, the Sellers have good right 
to convey and will assume and pay any indebtednes~ 
existing against the property. To balloon such ambiguous 
language into a false and fraudulent representation as 
to the condition of the premises is, we feel, unwarranted. 
It is unwarranted particularly where, as here, the con-
tract is in large measure the Buyers' contract, which 
Sellers were, to some degree at least, pressured into 
signing. 
"The language of a covenant must be read in an 
ordinary or popular, and not in a legal or tech-
nical sense. 21 CJS Page 896." 
" ... the representation must contain the essential 
elements of fraud; and it must be definite and 
specific, mere vague, general or indefinite state-
ments being insufficient, .... " 37 CJS Page 224. 
Let us assume, however, a less ambiguous state-
ment. Assume the contract provided as follows: "Sell-
ers warrant the premises are free from all encum-
brances". This is the language that would be impliedly 
contained in a warranty deed. Would the existence of 
a party wall agreement make this statement a false and 
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fraudulent representation~ vV e find no cases on the 
fraud question specifically. However, if the party wall 
agreement would not constitute a breach of this express 
warranty, by the same token its existence would certain-
ly not make the representation false and fraudulent. 
The cases hold that under similar circumstances a party 
wall agreement does not violate a warranty against en-
cumbrances. 
We find no Utah cases. What appears to be the 
general rule is stated in 92 C.JS, paragraph 206, page 
66, as follows : 
"Ordinarily a party wall easement is not an 
encumbrance warranting rejection of title by a 
purchaser contracting for a conveyance free of 
encumbrances, a mutual easement of adjoining 
proprietors in a party wall being a benefit and 
not a burden. It has been held that a party wall 
is not such an encumbrance as justifies rejection 
of title where there is no representation on the 
subject in the contract, where existence of party 
walls is plainly discernible from inspection of 
the premises, and where the party wall agree-
ment contains no covenant to rebuild but relates 
solely to the existing wall as long as it may stand, 
or where the sale was by house number instead 
of by metes and bounds; nor is a party wall agree-
ment an encumbrance where it is a mere personal 
covenant not running with the land." 
As to the party wall in this case, there is no repre-
sentation on the subject in the contract. The evidence 
indicates the party wall is plainly discernible from in-
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spection, the party wall agreement contains no covenant 
to rebuild, and the sale was by house number and not 
be metes and bounds. 
American Jurisprudence states the rule as follows: 
"The question whether the existence of a 
party wall upon or at the division line between 
the vendor's land and the land of an adjoining 
owner used or intended to be used by both in the 
construction or maintenance of buildings on 
their respective tracts, or an agreement for the 
construction and maintenance of such a wall of 
such character as to run with the land, constitutes 
an encumbrance within the meaning of the rule 
which requires the vendor in a contract for the 
sale of land free and clear of encumbrances is a 
question upon which the decisions are not entirely 
consistent. 1\fost of the difficulty seems to arise, 
however, from the fact that in some cases the 
party wall was erected entirely upon the land 
of the vendor, or he and his successors in inter-
est were obligated to maintain, repair, or re-
build the wall in case of injury 'or destruction, 
whereas in other cases the wall rested upon the 
properties of both adjoining owners for their 
mutual advantage and benefit. The rule sup-
ported by the majority of the cases and by sound 
reasoning is that a party wall standing equally 
upon the land of adjoining proprietors, the cen-
tral line of which is throughout coincident with 
the line . of division between the respective pre-
mises, constitutes no such encmnbrance upon or 
defect in the title of either owner as will relieve 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a purchaser from his contract to purchase the 
land, :-;o long, at least, as no onerous burdens in 
respect of repair or rebuilding are imposed upon 
the owner thereof; where the wall rests equally 
upon both lots the detriment sustained by each 
tenement, in becoming servient to the other, is 
compensated by the benefit it derives from hav-
ing the other made equally servient to it. The mu-
tual easement for the support of the wall is a 
benefit, and not a burden, to the purchaser as 
well as to the adjacent proprietor. It is a valuable 
appurtenance, which passes with the title of the 
property, and its value to the purchaser is not 
diminished by the fact that it is equally bene-
ficial to the adjacent owners." 55 American J u-
risprudence, Vendor and Purchaser, page 686. 
It seems, therefore, that even if the language of the 
contract unambiguously and specifically stated what de-
fendants contend that this language says, and even if 
all the other elements of fraud were present in this case, 
there would still be no fraudulent representation because 
t~e existence of the party wall agreement is not incon-
sistent with the warranty or representation that there 
are no encumbrances. 
However, are all or even any of the other elements 
of fraud present in this case~ The essential elements of 
fraud were not pleaded by defendants, but we make no 
objection to this since we have previously made none. 
Nonetheless, all the essential elements must be proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence so as to satisfy the 
trier of fact. 
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The nine essential elements of fraud are set forth 
in Stuck vs. Delta Land & Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 
Pac. 791, as follows: 
" ' * * * (1) A representation; (2) its fal-
sity; (3) its 1nateriality; (4) the speaker's knowl-
edge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; ( 5) 
his intent that it should be acted upon by the per-
son and in the manner reasonably comtemplated; 
(6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his 
reliance upon its truth; ( 8) his right to rely 
thereon; (9) his consequent and proximate in-
jury'." 
We don't propose to consider and weigh separately 
each of these nine essential elements against the evi-
dence. However, the following facts stand out: The party 
wall was of no importance, no materiality, to Mr. Bos-
worth when he himself acquired the property (T-19). 
He at no time attached any real significance to it. It 
was plainly visible on inspection, and Mr. Bosworth 
gave defendants every reasonable opporhmity to in-
spect. If it was clearly discernible to him, to the archi-
tect on first glance, and to the trial court, how can it 
reasonably be said that he knew, after defendants had 
both inspected the property, that they were unaware of 
it? And how can it be said that it suddently became of 
vital importance to him and he designedly concealed it 
from them 1 The parties were dealing at anns length, 
and Mr. Bosworth tried to avoid this quick transaction 
-tried to involve attorneys to handle the transaction 
in the normal1nanner. Defendant N onnan almost punch-
ed witness Giles in the nose when Giles urged the parties 
to wait and handle it right (T-10). The defendants had 
10 
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inspected the building, they wanted it, they wanted it im-
mediately, and they wanted no lawyer foolishness in-
volved in their purchase. Just a little delay would have 
disclosed the party wall agreement (but we don't think 
it would have made a particle of difference to the de-
fendants at that time). They resisted all efforts at delay, 
and now they Ray they were fraudulently taken advan-
tage of. 
Did Mr. Bosworth have a duty to speak up· about 
the wall o? If he knew that even after inspection defend-
ants were not aware of the wall; and if he knew that it 
was of vital importance to them, or at least of mater-
ialty to them; and if he knew they would not buy the 
property if he spoke, then perhaps there might be fraud 
in failing to speak if all the other elements of fraud 
were present. But the evidence just does not permit the 
resolving of all these 'ifs' preponderantly for the de-
fendantf;. 
We feel justified in concluding, therefore, without 
further belaboring the matter, that the court did not 
err in concluding as a factual matter there was no fraud 
on the part of the plaintiffs justifiably relied upon by 
the defendants that would either justify their rescission 
of the contract or support their claim to damages. We 
feel that we need not in this brief specifically respond 
to defendants' second point, since this whole brief is a 
responRe to that point as well as to the first point. 
In conclusion, we acknowledge the right of the 
Supreme Court to reverse the trial court on its factual 
findings. We appreciate, too, however, that the Supreme 
Court has frequently admonished litigants it would not 
11 
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reverse the findings of the trial court in an equity case 
unless the evidence clearly preponderates against those 
findings. The trial court had many advantages not avail-
able to the appellate court, not the least of which was 
the opportunity to visually inspect the premises. Speak-
ing most conservatively, the least that can be said about 
the evidence in this case is that the trial court's factual 
findings are not unreasonable and they should be sus-
tained on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Daniel A. Alsup 
of 
Richards, Alsup & Richards 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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